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Abstract 
We examine whether aggressive forms of collective action are predicted by their perceived 
efficacy and the perceived efficacy of peaceful collective action, and whether the two predictors 
interact. We present data from surveys examining support for and tendencies toward aggressive 
collective action among university students opposed to increases in tuition fees in Britain (Study 
1), and support for suicide bombings against Israeli civilians among Palestinians during the second 
Intifada (Study 2). Our results reveal an interaction between the efficacy of peaceful and 
aggressive collective actions: the more efficacious aggression is perceived to be, the greater its 
appeal and the less it is assuaged by the efficacy of peaceful action. This implies that 1) people 
may consider aggressive action whenever it works, even if peaceful action is efficacious, and 2) 
people may consider aggressive action even when it seems unpromising, if peaceful action is not 
efficacious, in an apparent nothing-to-lose strategy.  
Keywords: Efficacy, collective action, political violence, aggression, nonviolence
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Collective action is typically defined as action undertaken by an individual on 
behalf of a group with the aim of improving the status, power or influence of that group 
(Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990b; van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). It can take many 
forms, which can be divided into peaceful (e.g. demonstrations, sit-ins) or aggressive 
actions (e.g. riots, physical attacks, terrorist attacks). We define aggressive collective action 
in the present research as action that involves the use of physical force with the intention to 
physically hurt other people or damage property, which peaceful collective action does not 
entail. We define violent collective action as a subset of aggressive collective action and as 
an extreme form of aggression against people, intended to inflict severe physical harm (e.g. 
serious injury or death) (see Allen & Anderson, 2016).1 Despite the societal attention that 
aggressive collective action generally attracts, empirical studies in this area remain scarce 
compared to those on peaceful actions (Wright, 2009). The present research focuses on 
how efficacy considerations, previously shown to be important predictors of peaceful 
collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), predict aggressive forms of 
collective action. Recent research has identified low group efficacy – a sense that one’s 
group is incapable of resolving its grievances – as a predictor of aggressive collective 
action (Tausch, Becker, Spears et al., 2011). However, to date there has been no systematic 
empirical investigation of how aggressive forms of collective action are uniquely 
influenced by their own perceived efficacy as well as the efficacy of peaceful collective 
actions, nor, importantly, the potential interaction between the two. The objective of our 
research is to address this gap.  
The Role of Efficacy in Collective Action 
In the context of group-based action, efficacy refers to the perceived likelihood that 
collective action will achieve a desired social change. Different social-psychological approaches 
to collective action such as Relative Deprivation Theory (Folger, 1986; Mummendey, Kessler, 
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Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Smith & Kessler, 2004), Resource Mobilization Theory (Klandermans, 
1984), and Social Identity Theory (SIT: Tajfel & Turner, 1979) have long stressed the influence 
of pragmatic considerations on collective action, using notions similar to that of efficacy. SIT, 
for example, focuses on the concept of (in)stability of intergroup relations (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979), whereby a stable social system is unresponsive to attempts by group members to improve 
the position of their group, whereas an unstable social system is (see Wright, 2001, for a 
distinction between efficacy and stability). Classical SIT suggests that group members who view 
their group’s position as illegitimately disadvantaged are more likely to challenge the status quo 
collectively if they view their disadvantage as unstable (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Other lines of research emphasize the concept of group efficacy (Smith, Cronin, & Kessler, 
2008; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004), which 
refers to group members’ belief that they can effectively resolve a problem facing their group 
through collective effort (Bandura, 1995, 1997; Mummendey et al., 1999).  
Despite differences across these theories, all of them have traditionally stressed that, in 
order to participate in collective action, members of a disadvantaged group must believe that 
they can improve the conditions of their group and resolve their grievances through collective 
action. Research has generally found support for this idea (Hornsey et al., 2006; Kelly & 
Breinlinger, 1995; van Zomeren et al., 2004; see van Zomeren et al., 2008, for meta-analytic 
evidence).  
However, a critical look at the quantitative evidence on the link between efficacy and 
collective action shows a rather exclusive focus on the prediction of peaceful forms of collective 
action (Hornsey et al., 2006; van Zomeren et al., 2008), despite the obvious social and practical 
implications of research on aggressive forms of action (Wright, 2009). Importantly, some 
research seems to suggest that, unlike peaceful collective action, aggressive forms of collective 
action may be motivated by the low perceived likelihood that a desired social change will be 
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achieved. For example, Tausch et al. (2011) found that group efficacy was positively related to 
peaceful actions but negatively related to aggressive action tendencies (Study 1). Similarly, van 
Zomeren, Saguy and Schellhaas (2013) found group efficacy to be negatively predictive of 
aggressive collective action tendencies (Study 2). Tausch et al. (2011) argued that resorting to 
aggression in a situation offering little hope can be highly strategic and functional, as it could 
help garner support for the cause (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2006), for example by provoking the 
opponent into extreme counter-action (see Sedgwick, 2004). By destabilizing the status quo, 
aggression may thus facilitate the conditions that could lead to social change in the long run (see 
also Louis & Taylor, 2002; Spears, Scheepers, van Zomeren, Tausch & Gooch, 2015).  
The findings of Tausch et al. (2011) and van Zomeren et al. (2012) concur with earlier 
research suggesting that difficulty in improving a disadvantaged group’s position is linked to 
more aggressive collective action, rather than inaction. Ransford (1968) found that aggressive 
action tendencies in the context of the Watts Riots were positively correlated with feelings of 
powerlessness and lack of control. Similarly, Wright and colleagues (1990b) found that 
participants assigned to a disadvantaged group were more likely to opt for disruptive (non-
normative) forms of collective action when they were denied opportunities to move to an 
advantaged group. They also found that lack of hope for an improvement of their position best 
distinguished participants who chose disruptive forms of collective action from those who chose 
other forms of action (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990a; see also Kamans, Spears, Otten, 
Gordijn, & Livingstone, 2012).  
More recently, a series of experimental studies by Scheepers, Spears, Doosje and 
Manstead (2006; see also Spears et al., 2015) found that, contrary to classical predictions of SIT, 
groups with stable low status were more likely to support a relatively aggressive strategy of 
derogating the outgroup in rewards and ratings, compared to groups with unstable low status, 
especially when this discrimination was visible to the outgroup audience. Scheepers et al. (2006) 
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and Spears et al. (2015) referred to this as a “nothing to lose” strategy. They proposed that this 
strategy stems from the belief that doing nothing is unlikely to change the situation whereas 
using a confrontational strategy, in comparison, has the potential to improve or at least unsettle 
the situation. 
Importantly, the research just reviewed on the influence of pragmatic considerations on 
aggressive forms of group action has thus far focused primarily on the perceived general 
possibility of achieving a desirable social change rather than the efficacy of different collective 
action types. This lack of specificity might explain some inconsistencies in the link between 
efficacy considerations and aggressive collective action (e.g. the link was not significant in 
Studies 2 and 3 in Tausch et al., 2011). As pointed out by both Tausch et al. (2011) and van 
Zomeren et al. (2012), it is not clear how aggressive forms of action are predicted by perceptions 
of their efficacy, as well as by the perceived efficacy of other, peaceful forms of collective 
action. The aim of the present research is therefore to address this issue. 
The Present Research 
Our research examines how aggressive action efficacy and peaceful action efficacy 
predict aggressive forms of collective action. Although peaceful forms of action are equally 
important they fall outside the scope of the current paper. We now review existing research on 
how efficacy considerations relate specifically to aggressive forms of collective action and 
outline our predictions.  
According to the expectancy-value theory of behavior, the perceived expectancy that 
some behavior will result in a valued outcome should positively predict the intention to engage 
in that behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). In line with this idea, there is considerable empirical 
evidence that the perceived efficacy of peaceful actions at achieving desired group ends is a 
positive predictor of peaceful collective action (e.g. Hornsey et al., 2006; van Zomeren et al., 
2008). However, research on the relation between the perceived efficacy of aggressive collective 
Action efficacy and aggressive collective action 
 
 
8
8
action and its endorsement/pursuit is comparatively scarce. Most of the evidence comes from 
qualitative accounts of crowd events that involved conflict with the police. For example, 
following a qualitative investigation of “the battle of Westminster”, a conflict between student 
demonstrators and the police in Britain, Reicher (1996) suggested that an essential precondition 
for such conflicts to erupt is for crowd members to perceive clashes with the police to be 
effective at achieving desired ends. Subsequent accounts of conflictual crowd events led to the 
development of the Elaborated Social Identity Model of collective action, which highlights the 
importance of crowd members feeling empowered through their unity before confronting an 
oppositional police force (e.g. Drury & Reicher, 1999; Stott & Drury, 2000; Reicher & Stott, 
2011,  see also Drury, Evripidou, & van Zomeren, 2015 for a review). To our knowledge, only 
Ginges and Atran (2011) have quantitatively examined the link between aggressive collective 
action and its perceived efficacy. In a study on Israeli settlers (Study 1), they found no link 
between willingness to take part in acts of political violence in the event of settlement 
dismantlement and the perceived efficacy of such acts. However, their study was scenario-based, 
and they examined the perceived efficacy of politically violent acts in Israeli society in general 
rather than in the specific context of the study, which might explain their null results. If 
aggressive collective action is at least partially rationally motivated, it should be positively 
predicted by its perceived efficacy at achieving desired group aims (see van Zomeren et al., 
2013, for a similar prediction). Hence, people should be more likely to pursue aggressive 
collective action the more efficacious they perceive it to be for resolving their grievances.  
The perceived efficacy of peaceful collective action, however, is also likely to play a role 
in predicting aggressive collective action. Researchers have long theorized that people are more 
likely to resort to political violence when peaceful alternatives are seen as ineffective at 
addressing grievances (Bloom, 2004; Crenshaw, 1990; Louis, 2009; Pruitt & Gahagan, 1974), 
given that aggressive/violent collective action is typically riskier than peaceful collective action 
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(e.g. see Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Wright, 2009). Accordingly, increasing the perceived 
efficacy of peaceful forms of action is thought to help reduce or prevent political violence. 
Surprisingly, until recently evidence in support of the hypothesized negative relation 
between peaceful action efficacy and aggressive collective action was based solely on qualitative 
studies, such as case studies of political conflicts (Pruitt & Gahagan, 1974) and interviews with 
militants involved in acts of political violence (Masters, 2004; Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003; 
Soibelman, 2004). However, Zaal, van Laar, Ståhl and Ellemers (2012) recently reported 
correlational and experimental evidence that the perceived efficacy of mild peaceful collective 
action (e.g. demonstrations) overall negatively predicts support for more aggressive forms of 
collective action (e.g. occupying buildings, vandalism, sabotage). More relevantly, a survey of 
protesters by Louis, Paasonnen, Hornsey et al. (2015) found that the perceived efficacy of 
peaceful demonstrations at influencing policy-makers overall negatively predicted support for 
violence during protests.  
Accordingly, we would expect that overall, aggressive collective action would relate 
positively to its perceived efficacy, and negatively to the perceived efficacy of peaceful 
collective action. Importantly, however, previous research has not considered the possibility that  
aggressive collective action may result from an interaction between the perceived efficacy of 
peaceful and aggressive collective action. Yet, it is conceivable that the perceived inefficacy of 
peaceful actions leads to aggressive acts depending on whether such acts are efficacious or not. 
The present research therefore aims to test this possibility.  
The Influence of Aggressive Action Efficacy on the Link between Peaceful Action Efficacy 
and Aggressive Collective Action 
We consider three competing hypotheses for how the link between the perceived efficacy 
of peaceful action and the endorsement/pursuit of aggressive collective action strategies may be 
affected by the perceived efficacy of aggressive collective action. For ease of interpretation, 
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these hypotheses are illustrated in Figure 1. According to one moderation hypothesis, individuals 
resort to aggression only when peaceful action has low efficacy, and especially if aggression is 
efficacious (panel 1, Figure 1). This assumes that people do not resort to aggression whenever it 
is effective. Instead, they resort to aggression only after they have exhausted peaceful options  
(e.g. Pruitt & Gahagan, 1974), at which point they resort to aggression to the extent that it is 
effective. Given that this hypothesis assumes that people give primacy to peaceful means of 
social change before using violence, we term this interaction the “primacy of peaceful means” 
hypothesis. 
A competing hypothesis, however, is that the more efficacious aggressive collective 
action is perceived to be, the less it would be affected by the perceived efficacy of peaceful 
means (panel 2, Figure 1). This is based on the idea that people who view aggressive collective 
action to be efficacious may decide to pursue it regardless of the efficacy of peaceful action. 
Importantly, this does not necessarily mean they will only consider aggressive strategies. 
Instead, they may pursue both aggressive and peaceful strategies in parallel if both have high 
efficacy, in order to maximize the chances of achieving the desired social change or to reach it 
more efficiently. Given that this hypothesis assumes that peaceful and aggressive collective 
actions are complementary rather than mutually exclusive strategies, we term it “the gun and the 
olive branch” hypothesis. Consistent with this idea, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) noted the 
simultaneous use of both aggressive/violent and peaceful resistance methods in various 
campaigns in recent history (see also Dudouet, 2008), such as the South African struggle for 
liberation (Schock, 2005).  
While both moderation hypotheses are conceivable as they reflect differences in existing 
guiding principles concerning the use of aggression, a third conceivable hypothesis is that 
peaceful action efficacy and aggressive action efficacy have additive, independent effects on 
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aggressive collective action. We term this the “independent effects” hypothesis (panel 3, Figure 
1).  
The “Nothing to Lose” Hypothesis 
Regardless which of these competing hypotheses is supported, we believe it is of special 
theoretical importance to determine if aggressive forms of collective action could gain appeal in 
response to the perceived inefficacy of peaceful actions, even if aggression itself is perceived to 
have low efficacy. That is, would peaceful action efficacy have a negative simple effect on 
aggressive action (even) when aggression has low efficacy? Obviously, this negative simple 
effect is automatically implied by both “the gun and the olive branch” moderation hypothesis as 
well as the “independent effects” hypothesis (see panels 2 and 3, Figure 1). Conversely, the 
“primacy of peaceful means” moderation hypothesis (see panel 1, Figure 1) suggests that the 
inefficacy of peaceful means may lead to no escalation in aggression if such aggression is 
perceived to have low efficacy. We argue, however, that the efficacy of peaceful actions 
negatively predicts aggressive collective action when aggression has low efficacy. We therefore 
advance a specific hypothesis regarding this simple effect, which we term the “nothing to lose” 
hypothesis.  
This prediction might at first seem counterintuitive in light of the expectancy-value 
theory of behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and the classical view in the literature suggesting 
that people should have little motivation to pursue collective action in circumstances offering 
little scope for change (Bandura, 1997; Smith & Kessler, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Wright, 2001).  
Importantly, however, as mentioned previously, some recent work has argued that 
aggressive collective action strategies may sometimes be used in order to unsettle a stable social 
system and bring about the conditions that would facilitate social change in the long run (Louis 
& Taylor, 2002; Scheepers et al., 2006; Sedgwick, 2004; Spears et al., 2015; Tausch et al., 
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2011). For example, both Scheepers et al. (2006) and Spears et al. (2015) suggested that 
disadvantaged group members adopt more extreme forms of group action when the possibility of 
improving their conditions is low, as they have “nothing to lose”. That is, there may be more to 
gain by using an aggressive strategy than by doing nothing.  
The “nothing to lose” argument echoes an argument made by Masters (2004), who 
suggested that when group members face an ongoing injustice, and believe that inaction or 
peaceful means offer no chance of improving the status quo, while violent rebellion offers a 
chance, however slim, to improve the situation, they will tend to support violence even if it 
involves considerable risks. He based his argument on the assumption of loss aversion from 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which predicts that when faced with one choice 
involving a guaranteed loss, and another choice involving a likely loss of equal or greater value, 
people tend to prefer the risky option, because it offers at least the possibility, however small, to 
escape losses altogether. Masters (2004) found support for his argument in interviews with 
militants from Northern Ireland and Palestine. Accordingly, our “nothing to lose” hypothesis 
postulates that peaceful action efficacy will negatively predict aggressive collective action when 
such aggression is seen to have low efficacy. Importantly, this does not imply that in desperate 
circumstances, aggression will necessarily be favored over peaceful action. Rather, there will be 
greater aggression in absolute terms when neither peaceful nor aggressive actions are promising 
strategies, compared to when only peaceful action is promising. 
Overview of Studies 
We present two studies testing our hypotheses in different contexts. Study 1 examines 
support for aggressive collective action and aggressive action tendencies among British 
university students in response to proposed increases in university tuition fees. Study 2 examines 
support for suicide bombings among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza during the Second 
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Intifada, and attempts to disentangle the influence of efficacy perceptions from desire for 
revenge, and the perceived counter-productivity of aggression. 
Study 1 
This study was conducted online in the context of the British student protest movement 
against increases in university tuition fees and budget cuts to higher education, proposed by the 
coalition government (the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats) in the fall of 2010. 
Students took a number of peaceful actions, but some also engaged in aggressive actions, in 
what came to be known as the Millbank riot. This involved breaking into the headquarters of the 
Conservative party in London (the Millbank tower), including breaking windows and vandalism, 
and clashes with the police (throwing missiles and physical confrontations; The Guardian, 2010). 
The present study was conducted in December 2010, days before the parliamentary vote session 
on the proposed rise in tuition fees.  
Method 
Participants and procedure.  The study was advertised through a British rewards-based 
online shopping network and targeted British university students, offering them an opportunity 
to enter into a prize draw. There were 308 respondents (184 women, 121 men, three unknown), 
with a mean age of 22.76 (SD = 5.17). Most were British nationals (N = 278). The rest were 
European Union nationals (N = 16) or nationals from elsewhere.  
Measures. 
Perceived injustice.  Since some political figures framed the proposed educational 
reforms as being beneficial to some students (e.g. Coughlan, 2010), we expected some students 
to support the proposal and thus to have no motive for taking collective action against it, 
regardless of its efficacy. As our aim was to examine how efficacy concerns influence collective 
action among those who perceive a situation as unjust and who thus belong to the mobilization 
potential (Klandermans, 1984), we measured the perceived injustice of the proposed education 
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cuts and increase in tuition fees prior to administering our measures of interest, with a view to 
exclude from our analyses those who perceive these as fair. Participants responded using 7-point 
scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) to four items stating that education cuts and 
fees are “justified” (reverse-coded); “unfair”; “immoral“; and “legitimate” (reverse-coded). The 
items were averaged to yield a composite score of perceived injustice (α = .78). 
Perceived efficacy of aggressive and peaceful collective action.  Participants rated how 
effective they thought a list of three aggressive and three peaceful actions would be at preventing 
a vote on December 9th in favour of the planned education cuts and fees, using a ten-point scale 
(0=not effective at all, 9=extremely effective). Aggressive collective action was operationalized 
as breaking forcefully into offices of political parties supporting education cuts and fees (e.g. 
like the occupation of the Millbank Tower), attacking offices of political parties or politicians 
supporting education cuts and fees, and throwing eggs or rotten fruit at politicians supporting 
education cuts and fees. Peaceful collective action was operationalized as signing petitions, 
peaceful demonstrations and classroom walkouts (strikes). All of these actions, except for 
throwing eggs or rotten fruit at politicians, had already occurred as part of the student protest 
activities at the time of the survey. The items were averaged to yield composites of the perceived 
efficacy of aggressive collective action (α =.95) and the perceived efficacy of peaceful collective 
action (α =.89). 
Support for aggressive collective action.  Participants rated the extent to which they 
supported or opposed the use of aggressive actions (same as above) against education cuts and 
fees before the vote on December 9th, on an 11-point scale (-5=strongly oppose, 0=neither 
support nor oppose, 5=strongly support). The items were averaged to yield a composite score of 
support for aggressive collective action (α = .95). 
Aggressive collective action tendencies.  Participants rated the likelihood that they would 
participate in aggressive actions (same as above) against education cuts and fees before the vote 
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on December 9th, using a ten-point scale (0 = not likely at all, 9 = extremely likely). The items 
were averaged to yield a composite score of aggressive collective action tendencies (α = .98) 2. 
Results and Discussion 
A missing value analysis revealed that all variables had less than 1% missing values. 
Two participants failed to complete entire scales and were therefore deleted from our dataset. 
The rest of the missing values were imputed using the Expectation Maximization method (EM) 
(Tabachnick & Fidel, 2007). Out of range values were adjusted to the nearest acceptable score. 
Analyses revealed that 20.6% of the sample (n = 62) scored lower than the mid-point of the 
Likert scale (<4) on the measure of perceived injustice of the proposed education cuts and raise 
in tuition fees, indicating they perceived these to be fair. We thus excluded them from 
subsequent analyses. The final sample consisted of 243 students (147 female, 95 male, 1 
unknown; mean age = 22.69, SD = 4.88). Details of all variables of interest and a correlation 
matrix are reported in Table 1.  
Analytic strategy.  We conducted two multiple regression analyses using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) multiple regression, with support for aggressive collective action and aggressive 
collective action tendencies as outcome variables. Our predictors consisted of the efficacy of 
peaceful and aggressive collective action and their interaction. All continuous predictors were 
centred prior to our analyses, following recommendations by Aiken and West (1991). We report 
unstandardized regression coefficients. Significant interactions were followed with simple slope 
tests, where we standardized our predictors and outcome variables, and examined the impact of 
the efficacy of peaceful action at one standard deviation above and below the efficacy of 
aggressive action.  The same analytic strategy was used across both studies.  
Support for aggressive collective action.  The regression model explained 68.7% of the 
variance (adjusted R-Square), F (3, 239) = 178.27, p < .001. As expected, aggressive action 
efficacy emerged as a significant positive predictor, b = .92, SE = .05, t (239) = 20.18, p < .001. 
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Peaceful action efficacy, on the other hand, was not a significant predictor, b = -.03, SE = .06, t 
(239) = -.58, p = .57, ns. However, we found a significant interaction effect, b = .04, SE = .02, t 
(239) = 2.39, p = .018, which is plotted in Figure 2. Follow-up simple slope tests showed that in 
line with “the gun and the olive branch” interaction, peaceful action efficacy negatively 
predicted support for aggression when aggression had low efficacy, β = -.10, SE = .05, t (239) = 
-2.14, p = .033, but not when aggression had high efficacy, β =.05, SE = .05, t (239) = 0.99, p = 
.32, ns. Moreover, the results support the “nothing to lose” hypothesis, given that peaceful action 
efficacy negatively predicted support for aggressive action when such aggression had low 
efficacy. 
Aggressive collective action tendencies.  The regression model explained 54.3% of the 
variance (adjusted R-Square), F (3, 239) = 97.02, p < .001. As expected, aggressive action 
efficacy emerged as a significant positive predictor, b = .73, SE = .05, t (239) = 14.68, p < .001. 
Peaceful action efficacy, on the other hand, was not a significant predictor, b = -.02, SE = .06, t 
(239) = -.33, p = .74, ns. However, a significant interaction effect emerged, b = .04, SE = .02, t 
(239) = 2.23, p = .027. We probed this interaction further and plotted it in Figure 3. 
Follow-up simple slope tests showed that, in line with “the gun and the olive branch” 
interaction, peaceful action efficacy negatively (though not significantly) predicted aggressive 
action tendencies when aggression had low efficacy, β = -.10, SE = .06, t (239) = -1.83, p = .07, 
ns, but not when aggression had high efficacy, β = .07, SE = .07, t (239) = 1.07, p = .28, ns. 
Moreover, the results support the “nothing to lose” hypothesis, given that peaceful action 
efficacy negatively predicted aggressive action tendencies when such aggression had low 
efficacy 3. 
To summarize, Study 1 provided initial evidence of an interaction effect between 
perceptions of peaceful and aggressive action efficacy in predicting inclinations toward 
aggressive collective action among British University students, in the campaign against 
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increased tuition fees. Support for and tendencies to engage in aggressive collective action were 
overall positively predicted by the perceived efficacy of aggressive acts, but showed no overall 
relation with peaceful action efficacy. Importantly, however, an interaction effect emerged 
between peaceful and aggressive action efficacy in predicting support for aggressive action and 
aggressive action tendencies. The pattern of this interaction was consistent with “the gun and the 
olive branch” hypothesis, such that the more efficacious aggression was perceived to be, the less 
the efficacy of peaceful action mattered for deciding whether or not to support aggressive actions 
or engage in them. Importantly, the results also supported the “nothing to lose hypothesis”, since 
when aggression had low efficacy, the efficacy of peaceful actions negatively predicted support 
for aggression and aggressive action tendencies, although the link did not achieve conventional 
levels of significance for the latter.  
This study, however, tested our hypotheses by focusing on aggressive collective actions 
which are not violent per se, as they do not involve the intention to physically harm people. In 
the next study, we examine a violent and more extreme form of aggressive collective action, 
namely suicide bombings, in the context of the Palestinian struggle for independence from 
Israeli occupation. Importantly, we test whether perceptions of aggressive and peaceful action 
efficacy predict support for aggression over and above other potentially powerful predictors of 
aggression, namely desire for revenge and the perceived counter-productivity of aggression.  
Study 2 
This study examined support for suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, using data 
from a public opinion poll with a randomly selected sample of Palestinians in Gaza and the West 
Bank during the Second Intifada (uprising between 2000-2005). This period witnessed the use of 
both nonviolent collective actions and over a hundred suicide bombing attacks targeting Israeli 
soldiers and/or civilians (Brym & Araj, 2006). The poll, commissioned to the Program on 
International Policy Attitudes of the University of Maryland, aimed to investigate the potential 
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for a completely nonviolent uprising. The survey was conducted in Arabic during August 12-19, 
2002, by a Palestinian polling organization using face-to-face interviews and had a margin of 
error of ±4% (Kull, Ramsay, Warf, & Wolford, 2002).  
It has previously been argued that the primary motive of suicide bombings is national 
liberation (Pape, 2005), while other work has advanced revenge as the main motive (Brym & 
Araj, 2006). Araj (2012) recently analyzed pre-attack statements of a randomly selected sample 
of Palestinian suicide bombers (N = 42), and interviewed their relatives and friends. He found 
that taking revenge for Israeli attacks against Palestinians constituted a primary motivation for 
the majority, while liberating Palestine constituted a secondary or tertiary motivation for about 
half of them. This suggests that both the perceived efficacy of aggression and desire for revenge 
may uniquely predict aggressive collective action. Araj’s (2012) research is the first to examine 
the separate contributions of national liberation and revenge motives to the explanation of 
suicide bombings. However, his findings are based on a content analysis of self-reported motives 
for suicide bombings and retrospective explanations by family members, which may not 
accurately reflect suicide bombers’ real motives. In the present study, we examine whether 
perceptions of aggressive and peaceful action efficacy can uniquely predict support for suicide 
bombings, over and above desire for revenge. Although support is different from actual 
engagement in such attacks, it is likely to be a proximal predictor of engagement (e.g. Mascini, 
2006) and is important to study in its own right. In line with Araj’s (2012) findings, we expect 
desire for revenge to positively predict support for suicide bombings. 
Another important factor that might influence the decision to endorse aggressive 
collective action, is its (perceived) potential counter-productivity. During the second Palestinian 
Intifada, it was frequently argued that suicide bombing attacks targeting Israeli civilians 
decrease international support for the Palestinian cause (Amayreh, 2002) and are therefore 
counterproductive. Research on peaceful collective action has shown it be to be positively and 
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uniquely predicted by both the perceived efficacy of peaceful action at increasing public opinion 
support and at influencing policy-makers and thus redressing a perceived injustice (Hornsey, 
Blackwood, Louis et al., 2006). The present research extends this argument to examine whether 
efficacy perceptions of peaceful and aggressive actions can uniquely predict support for 
aggressive collective action, over and above the perceived counter-productivity of aggressive 
actions in influencing public opinion. We expect the anticipated counter-productivity of 
aggressive collective action, namely in reducing public support for the ingroup’s cause, to 
negatively predict support for aggression. 
Method 
Participants.  The interview was completed by 600 respondents. All variables of interest 
had less than 5% missing data. We excluded 67 participants who had missing data on one or 
more of our three key variables as these were single-item measures. The final sample consisted 
of 533 participants (272 men, 259 women, 2 unknown) of various ages (18-29 years, n = 181; 
30-39 years, n = 205; 40-49 years, n = 83; 50 years or more, n = 54; 10 unknown) and levels of 
education (9 years of education or less, n = 138; 10-13 years of education, n = 176; college 
degree holders, n = 106; college graduates, n = 108; 5 unknown). They also supported various 
political parties (Fatah, n = 113, Hamas or Islamic Jihad, n = 157; independent or unaffiliated, n 
=160, other or unknown, n = 103). 
Measures. 
Perceived efficacy of aggressive and peaceful collective action. We measured 
aggressive action efficacy using participants’ ratings of their degree of conviction with the 
following statement: “Using violence against Israeli civilians increases the likelihood that Israel 
will make compromises”. We measured peaceful action efficacy using participants’ ratings of 
their degree of conviction with the following statement: “Mass nonviolent action puts pressure 
on Israel while also undermining its excuse that it cannot negotiate as long as there is violence.” 
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Both statements were rated using a 4-point verbally-labelled scale (very convincing coded as 1, 
somewhat convincing (2), somewhat unconvincing (3), very unconvincing (4)). We reverse 
scored both items so that higher scores reflect greater perceived efficacy 4. 
Desire for revenge.  Participants rated their degree of conviction with the following 
statement: “Since Palestinians suffer at the hands of Israelis, then Israeli civilians should suffer 
at the hands of Palestinians”, using a 4-point scale (very convincing coded as 1, somewhat 
convincing (2), somewhat unconvincing (3), very unconvincing (4)). We reverse scored this item 
so that higher scores reflect a greater desire for revenge. 
Perceived counterproductivity of aggression.  Participants rated their degree of 
conviction with the following statement: “When Palestinians use violence against civilians this 
undermines support for the Palestinian cause”, using a 4-point scale (very convincing coded as 1, 
somewhat convincing (2), somewhat unconvincing (3), very unconvincing (4)). We reverse 
scored this item so that higher scores reflect greater perceived counter-productivity. 
Support for aggressive collective action.  Participants rated the extent to which they 
thought suicide bombings of Israeli civilians were a good idea as a method of resisting the Israeli 
occupation, on an 11-point scale (0 = it is not a good idea, 5 = neutral, 10 = it is a good idea) 5.  
Results and Discussion 
Details of all variables of interest and a correlation matrix are reported in Table 2. 
We regressed support for aggressive collective action on peaceful action efficacy, 
aggressive action efficacy, and their interaction, as well as desire for revenge and the 
perceived counter-productivity of aggression. We used the same analytic strategy as in 
Study 1. However, given that our data violated some assumptions of multiple linear 
regression (e.g. normality of errors, homoscedasticity), we used the bootstrapping 
procedure to estimate our model parameters as recommended by Field (2013), based on 
1000 bootstrap samples. We report bootstrapped regression coefficients adjusting for bias, 
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using bootstrap standard errors (SE), p-values, and bias-corrected accelerated (BCa) 95% 
confidence intervals (CI).  
Our regression model explained 17.5% of the variance in support for aggression 
(adjusted R-Square), F (5, 527) = 23.58, p < .001. Desire for vengeance emerged as a 
significant positive predictor, b = .86, Bias = -.005, SE = .20, 95% BCa 95% CI [0.47, 
1.24], p = .001, while the perceived counter-productivity of aggression emerged as a 
significant negative predictor, b = -.69, Bias = -.001, SE = .15, 95% BCa 95% CI [-0.99, -
0.41], p = .001. Aggressive action efficacy emerged as an overall significant positive 
predictor, b = .37, Bias = -.001, SE = .13, 95% BCa 95% CI [0.11.0.64], p = .004, while 
peaceful action efficacy emerged as an overall negative but not reliably significant 
predictor, b = -.25, Bias = -.003, SE = .15, 95% BCa 95% CI [-0.53, 0.05], p = .08. 
However, the interaction between peaceful and aggressive action efficacy was also 
significant, b = .28, Bias = .002, SE = .12, 95% BCa 95% CI [0.05, 0.50], p = .021. The 
pattern of this interaction is plotted in Figure 4. Follow-up simple slope tests showed that, 
in line with “the gun and the olive branch” hypothesis, support for aggressive collective 
action was negatively predicted by peaceful action efficacy when aggression had low 
efficacy, β = -.17, Bias = -.001, SE = .06, 95% BCa 95% CI [-.29, -.06], p = .005, but not 
when aggression had high efficacy, β = .01, Bias < .001, SE = .06, 95% BCa 95% CI [-
0.10, 0.12], p = .87. Moreover, the results support the “nothing to lose” hypothesis, given 
that peaceful action efficacy negatively predicted aggression when aggression had low 
efficacy 6. 
In sum, Study 2 provided further evidence of an interaction effect between peaceful and 
aggressive action efficacy in predicting support for a lethal form of aggressive collective action. 
Support for suicide bombings against Israeli civilians as a method of resisting the Israeli 
occupation was overall positively predicted by the efficacy of violence against civilians at 
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pushing Israel to compromise and negatively predicted by the efficacy of peaceful actions at 
pushing Israel to negotiate. However, these effects were qualified by a significant interaction 
which was consistent with “the gun and the olive branch” hypothesis, such that the greater the 
perceived efficacy of aggression was, the less the efficacy of peaceful actions mattered for 
deciding whether or not to endorse suicide bombings. Importantly, the “nothing to lose 
hypothesis” was also supported, since when violence against civilians was thought to have low 
efficacy at pushing Israel to compromise, support for suicide bombings was predicted by the 
perceived inefficacy of peaceful collective action at pushing Israel to negotiate. Interestingly, 
this study also showed that aggressive action efficacy, peaceful action efficacy and their 
interaction contribute uniquely to the prediction of support for aggression, over and above desire 
for vengeance and the perceived counter-productivity of aggression. As expected, support for 
suicide bombings was positively predicted by desire for revenge and negatively predicted by the 
perceived counter-productivity of aggression. 
General Discussion 
The main objective of the present research was to examine how aggressive forms of 
collective action are predicted by their perceived efficacy and by the perceived efficacy of 
peaceful collective action. A key question of our research was whether aggressive and peaceful 
action efficacy interact in predicting aggressive collective action. We considered three 
competing hypotheses: “the primacy of peaceful means”, “the gun and the olive branch” and 
“the independent effects” hypotheses. We presented the results of two studies that examined our 
hypotheses in different contexts. We now assess our findings in relation to our predictions and 
suggest directions for future research. After discussing some limitations in our research, we turn 
to the theoretical contributions and practical implications of our findings.  
Aggressive Collective Action as a Function of the Efficacy of Aggressive and Peaceful 
Actions, and their Interaction 
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In line with our predictions, the perceived efficacy of aggressive collective action at 
redressing perceived injustices overall positively predicted aggression support and aggressive 
action tendencies among British university students opposed to increases in tuition fees (Study 
1), as well as support for suicide bombings against Israeli civilians among Palestinians during 
the second Intifada (Study 2). These results are broadly consistent with the expectancy-value 
theory of behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and extend previous research that has demonstrated 
the importance of efficacy considerations to the prediction of peaceful forms of collective action 
(Klandermans, 1984; Hornsey et al., 2006; van Zomeren et al., 2008). 
 Conversely, the perceived efficacy of peaceful action at redressing perceived injustice 
did not, overall, reliably predict support for and tendencies toward aggressive collective action 
among British university students opposed to increases in tuition fees (Study 1) or Palestinian 
support for suicide bombing attacks against Israelis civilians (Study 2). Importantly, these effects 
were qualified by a significant interaction between peaceful and aggressive action efficacy, 
which showed a similar pattern in both studies. Consistent with “the gun and the olive branch” 
hypothesis, the more efficacious aggressive collective action was perceived to be, the more 
appealing it became and the less it was assuaged by the perceived efficacy of peaceful collective 
action. Hence, when aggression was seen to be an efficacious way of redressing a perceived 
injustice, people reported support for aggressive collective action and willingness to engage in it 
with relatively little regard to whether peaceful action was efficacious. Moreover, Study 2 found 
that “the gun and the olive branch” interaction holds independently from other motives and 
considerations, namely desire for revenge and the perceived counter-productivity of aggression. 
Given that ordinal interactions can result from a statistical artefact (Mitchell & Jolley, 
2006), it is worth considering whether “the gun and the olive branch” interaction falls in this 
category. In particular, the negative relation between peaceful action efficacy and aggression 
may appear to be weaker when aggression has high efficacy due to a ceiling effect. As illustrated 
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in the graphs of our studies, however, this is clearly not the case, as in neither study did support 
for aggression or aggressive action tendencies reach their maximal level when aggression had 
high efficacy.  
Hence, “the gun and the olive branch” interaction we found points to the need to qualify 
the claim that people resort to aggressive collective action only when peaceful means of change 
are perceived as ineffective (e.g. Bloom, 2004; Crenshaw, 1990; Louis, 2009; Pruitt & Gahagan, 
1974). Our results suggest that in contexts where both peaceful and aggressive actions are in use, 
people resort to aggressive collective action as long as it seems efficacious, even if peaceful 
action also seems efficacious. Note that this does not necessarily mean that people only consider 
aggressive action. Instead, people could regard aggressive and peaceful actions as 
complementary strategies to be used alongside each other, as a way to maximize the chances of 
achieving the desired social change goal or to achieve it more efficiently 7. 
The “Nothing to Lose” Hypothesis 
The emergence of “the gun and the olive branch” interaction pattern in both studies also 
means that the “nothing to lose” hypothesis was supported. In both studies, we found that when 
the perceived efficacy of aggression was low, support for aggressive collective action was 
negatively predicted by the perceived efficacy of peaceful collective action. There is some 
indication that this result extends to aggressive action tendencies (Study 1), although this effect 
did not reach conventional levels of significance. However, one would expect the effect on 
action tendencies to be weaker than that on action support since classic attitude-behavior models 
in psychology (e.g Ajzen, 1977; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974) consider intentions as more proximal 
predictors of action than attitudes because they take more account of practical constraints. In line 
with this, van Zomeren et al.’s (2008) meta-analysis found efficacy perceptions to predict 
attitudes toward (peaceful) collective action more strongly than action tendencies.  
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The evidence we found in support of the “nothing to lose” hypothesis is important as it 
seems to contradict the traditional view in the literature that collective action would be least 
likely to occur when the scope for change is most restricted (Bandura, 1997; Smith & Kessler, 
2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Zomeren, et al., 2008). If this view holds true, aggressive 
collective action should be least appealing among those who believe that both aggressive and 
peaceful strategies have low efficacy. However, our results show that aggressive inclinations are 
not at their lowest here, but are at their lowest among those who believe aggression has low 
efficacy and peaceful action has high efficacy. Our findings are thus consistent with an emerging 
body of research that suggests greater aggressive group action in situations characterized by 
restricted scope for change (Scheepers et al., 2006; Spears, et al., 2015; Tausch, et al., 2011; van 
Zomeren et al., 2013). However, unlike this other research, which has only examined variations 
in aggressive action as a function of the perceived general potential to change the status quo, the 
present work is the first to test variations in aggressive action as a function of the perceived 
efficacy of both aggressive and peaceful actions.  
The “nothing to lose” effect raises questions regarding the motives behind the increased 
endorsement of aggression in response to the inefficacy of peaceful action, despite the low 
efficacy of aggression itself. Preliminary analyses in Study 2 indicate that this effect is distinct 
from desire for revenge or the perceived counter-productivity of aggression. Building on 
Scheepers et al. (2006) and Spears et al.’s (2015) “nothing to lose” argument, as well as Masters’ 
(2004) line of reasoning, we have argued that aggression in conditions offering little hope and 
scope for change may be motivated by a desire to redress a perceived injustice (see also Tausch 
et al., 2011), because although it has low efficacy people may still consider it to be more 
promising than inaction, which would only preserve the status quo. There are various reasons 
why people may think aggression action would help, such as attracting attention and support 
from the wider public and building a movement (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2006; Klein, Spears & 
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Reicher, 2007; Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2014) perhaps by provoking an extreme 
counter-action by the opponent (see Sedgwick, 2004). Aggressive action might thus unsettle the 
status quo and facilitate the conditions that could lead to the desired social change in the long 
run (see also Louis & Taylor, 2002; Spears et al., 2015).  
However, there may be alternative explanations for this effect. Ginges and Atran (2011) 
have recently argued that people endorse/pursue violent strategies not necessarily (only) for 
collective material gains but because violence seems like the right/moral thing to do. In their 
survey among Israeli settlers (Study 1), the perceived righteousness of violence emerged as a 
predictor of violence support and violent action tendencies while the general efficacy of violent 
actions did not. Most notably, Haslam and Reicher (2012) have argued that in desperate 
circumstances such as Jewish people facing inevitable death in Nazi concentration camps, 
revolts occurred to preserve honor and pride rather than to secure survival. The goal behind 
resistance can thus change under overwhelming oppression and with it the definition of success 
(see Drury & Reicher, 2009; Drury et al., 2015). Hence, it may be that aggression comes to be 
seen as a moral response particularly when group members feel overwhelmed by the power of 
the adversary. 
Given the growing evidence documented in the present research and previous work 
showing that situations offering little scope for social change are linked with more aggressive 
intergroup behavioral tendencies (Scheepers et al., 2006; Tausch et al., 2011), future research 
should investigate the motives underlying this phenomenon (see Spears et al., 2015, for initial 
evidence). 
Desire for Revenge and the Counter-productivity of Aggression 
 In addition to the findings mentioned above, the present research helps to disentangle the 
influences of various factors on the endorsement of aggressive collective action, namely efficacy 
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perceptions of peaceful and aggressive actions, desire for revenge and the perceived counter-
productivity of aggression. 
While previous research has disputed the relative importance of territorial liberation 
motives and desire for revenge as immediate explanations of suicide bombing attacks in national 
liberation struggles (Brym & Araj 2006; Pape, 2005), our results contribute to this debate by 
showing that at the level of public support for suicide bombings against civilians, both desire for 
revenge and the perceived efficacy of aggression at obtaining concessions from the occupying 
power are linked with increases in support for aggression. These findings are consistent with 
Araj’s (2012) recent content analysis of suicide bombing justifications by attackers and their 
families, who invoke both types of explanations. Interestingly, our analysis also found a positive 
correlation between the efficacy of aggression at obtaining concessions and desire for revenge. 
Future research should therefore investigate if these two factors may feed into each other. 
The present research also shows that when deciding to endorse/pursue aggressive 
collective action, people not only take into account the perceived efficacy of peaceful and 
aggressive collective action at redressing a perceived injustice, they also seem to give 
consideration to the potential for aggression to demobilize support for the ingroup’s cause. In 
Study 2 we indeed found that the perceived counter-productivity of aggression in terms of 
undermining support for the ingroup’s cause is linked to lower support for suicide bombing 
attacks. In line with previous research showing that peaceful collective action is positively 
predicted by its perceived efficacy at increasing public support for a cause (Hornsey et al., 
2006), the present work similarly shows that the perceived potential of collective action at 
demobilizing public support is linked to lower support for aggressive collective action. 
Limitations 
Our results were based on correlational data, which prevents us from inferring causality 
between our predictors and dependent variables, or ruling out alternative explanations for our 
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results, such as the influence of third variables that were not controlled for. This, however, is a 
widespread issue in field research on collective action (e.g. Mummendey et al., 1999), where 
experimentation is not always easily achievable. Nevertheless, our analyses build on previous 
research, which has demonstrated a causal link between general efficacy considerations (e.g. 
group efficacy in van Zomeren et al., 2004) and collective action tendencies. Furthermore, Zaal 
et al. (2012) provided experimental evidence that the efficacy of peaceful actions increases 
support for more aggressive actions. That being said, we cannot rule out that aggression support 
and aggressive action tendencies may be justified by referring to their perceived efficacy. Hence, 
future research should use longitudinal and experimental methods to corroborate our results.  
We relied on single-item measures in Study 2 and our measure of peaceful action 
efficacy was a double-barrelled item implying the exclusive use of nonviolence. This is a 
limitation of secondary data analyses, but is offset by the benefits of a large representative 
sample from a hot conflict zone. Nevertheless, it is telling that we obtained similar results as in 
Study 1. Future studies should, however, further test our hypotheses using better efficacy 
measures. Like most past research, we also measured collective action using non-behavioral 
measures of collective action. While it is important to assess actual participation in collective 
action, behavioral measures are rare in the literature given the difficulty of obtaining them (see 
van Zomeren et al., 2008), particularly when it comes to aggressive actions. In Study 1, 
however, we used both support for and tendencies toward aggressive collective action as our 
outcome measures. Collective action tendencies have been found to be good predictors of actual 
participation in collective action (e.g., De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Moskalenko & 
McCauley, 2009). Nevertheless, it would be best if future studies test our hypotheses using more 
behavioral measures of aggressive collective action where possible. In Study 2, we focused on 
support for suicide bombings because behavioral data would have obviously been difficult if not 
impossible to get. Support for such forms of violence, however, is important to study as it is a 
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necessary first step towards participation in violence: becoming a supporter means becoming 
part of the mobilization potential (Klandermans, 1997; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; see Mascini, 
2006). Nevertheless, it is obvious that ultimately, only very few of those who support actions 
such as suicide bombings will participate in it. That being said, attitudinal support for violent 
collective action such as suicide bombings can translate into material support for groups that use 
violent strategies, which can help sustain these groups and their activities (Crenshaw, 1995; 
Gurr, 1998; Kruglanski et al., 2008; Post, 2007; Victoroff, 2005). As such, it is essential to study 
factors underlying support for violent collective action if we are to understand what helps 
perpetuate political violence.  
It is also important to point out that our studies were all based on contexts where both 
aggressive and peaceful collective action had already been initiated. Hence, our studies help 
explain the perpetuation of aggressive collective action rather than its initiation. While our 
research shows that those who perceive both aggressive and peaceful actions to be efficacious 
are reluctant to abandon aggression in contexts where it is already in use alongside peaceful 
means, they may be unlikely to initiate aggression in contexts where its use has been absent. 
Future research should extend the present findings by testing their replicability in different 
contexts where no resistance has yet occurred, or where peaceful means alone have been used. 
Using longitudinal studies to map out the development of aggression at various stages of a 
conflict would be particularly useful for this purpose. 
It should be noted that our research has examined only specific forms of aggressive 
action, namely destruction of property and aggression directed at politicians in the context of 
student protests and suicide bombings in the context of a national liberation struggle. 
Nevertheless, it is notable that we found a consistent pattern of results across different cultural 
contexts (in Britain and Palestine), different issues (anti-austerity protests and independence 
struggle), and different forms of aggression. However, to further examine the generalizability of 
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our results, future research should explore other forms of aggressive action in different contexts, 
such as riots or other forms of violence perpetuated by non-state actors (e.g. guerrillas).  
Contributions and Implications of the Present Research 
Despite the limitations of the present research we believe it extends the literature on 
efficacy and collective action in several important ways. By investigating the role of efficacy in 
predicting aggressive collective action, which is the subject of much theoretical and societal 
interest, our research helps the field move beyond the predominant focus on predictors of 
peaceful collective action (Wright, 2009). To our knowledge, the present work is the first 
quantitative research to shed light on how support for and tendencies toward aggressive 
collective action are influenced by the perceived efficacy of both peaceful and aggressive tactics. 
Our research goes beyond existing data (e.g. Ginges & Atran, 2011; Louis, et al., 2015; Zaal et 
et al., 2012) by testing the interaction between the efficacy of both peaceful and aggressive 
tactics, alongside other motives and deterrents of aggression, namely desire for revenge and the 
perceived counter-productivity of aggression.   
The idea that aggression is only used a last resort implies that increasing the perceived 
efficacy of peaceful action should minimize aggression (e.g. Louis et al., 2015; Tausch et al., 
2011). Our research suggests, however, that at least in contexts where both aggressive and 
peaceful action are in use, increasing the perceived efficacy of peaceful collective action may 
have little effect in reducing the appeal of aggressive strategies, as long as people believe that 
aggressive action will contribute to redressing a perceived injustice. In circumstances where both 
aggressive and peaceful actions are perceived to work, people seem relatively reluctant to 
abandon aggressive strategies, perhaps favoring the use of “the gun and the olive branch” 
strategy, whereby aggressive and peaceful means are endorsed/pursued in parallel. Conflicts in 
which both armed and peaceful resistance are used in parallel, such as in Burma, Chile, the 
Philippines and Nepal (Dudouet, 2008), South Africa and Palestine, may reflect underlying 
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beliefs in the efficacy of both strategies. Interestingly, such beliefs also seem to underlie the 
“ArmaLite and ballot box” strategy used by the Irish Republican Army (see Hayes & 
McAllister, 2005), exemplified by a Sinn Fein organiser saying at the party’s conference in 
1981: “Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone 
here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in the other, we take power in 
Ireland?” (as cited in English, 2003; pp 224-225). 
That being said, our research suggests that where both peaceful and aggressive collective 
actions are used, influencing the perceived efficacy of peaceful forms of collective action does 
have an assuaging effect on aggression when aggression is seen to have low efficacy. In sum, our 
results suggest that people will consider aggressive collective action as long as they do not have 
high hopes that peaceful strategies can help resolve an ongoing perceived social injustice or as 
long as they believe that aggressive action is efficacious. Aggressive forms of collective action 
seem thus least likely to occur when peaceful action is perceived to be efficacious and 
aggressive action is perceived to be inefficacious.  
Conclusion 
The present research is the first to explore how the endorsement/pursuit of aggressive 
collective action in various contexts is predicted by individual perceptions of the efficacy of both 
aggressive and peaceful tactics. Results from two studies suggest that support for and tendencies 
toward aggressive collective action are a function of an interaction between perceptions of 
peaceful and aggressive collective action: the more efficacious aggressive collective action is 
perceived to be, the greater its appeal and the less it seems influenced by the efficacy of peaceful 
means. Hence, greater efficacy of peaceful means is not always sufficient to assuage aggressive 
inclinations. The compelling but sobering message of our research is that it shows that when 
aggressive collective action is perceived to work, it may be appealing even if peaceful action is 
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also efficacious, and when aggressive collective action is perceived to be inefficacious, it may be 
appealing as long as peaceful action is not efficacious.
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Footnotes 
1
 We recognize that the term violent can be contentious when describing certain forms 
of collective action, depending on the perspective of actors/observers/law enforcers. 
2
 We also measured support for peaceful collective action and tendencies to engage in 
peaceful action using the same actions measured in peaceful action efficacy (see 
footnote 3). We conducted three separate principle components analyses on items 
measuring the efficacy of, support for and tendencies toward both peaceful and 
aggressive collective action. Each analysis showed that items pertaining to peaceful 
and aggressive actions loaded on two separate components. However, an extra 
peaceful action item pertaining to student occupations of university campus buildings 
cross-loaded on two factors (possibly because it is a less normative form of peaceful 
collective action) and was therefore excluded from our analysis. 
3 While not the main focus of our paper, for exploratory purposes, we regressed 
support for peaceful action and peaceful action tendencies separately on the same 
predictors. We expected peaceful action efficacy to be a positive predictor, in line 
with the value-expectancy theory of behavior and previous research (e.g. Ginges & 
Atran, 2011; Hornsey et al., 2006; van Zomeren et al., 2008). However, we had no 
clear predictions concerning the effect of aggressive action efficacy. As expected, 
peaceful action efficacy emerged as a significant positive predictor of support for and 
tendencies toward peaceful action, over and above the effect of aggressive action 
efficacy. As for aggressive action efficacy, its effects were inconsistent. Aggressive 
action efficacy negatively predicted support for peaceful action, but also moderated 
the effect of peaceful action efficacy: the more efficacious aggressive action was 
perceived to be, the more peaceful action support became influenced by its efficacy. 
Surprisingly, however, aggressive action efficacy positively predicted peaceful action 
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tendencies (no significant interaction). One potential explanation is that aggression 
efficacy contributes to a general sense of efficacy that fosters peaceful collective 
action. Note that support for peaceful and aggressive action did not correlate 
(Pearson’s r = .03) but peaceful and aggressive action tendencies were positively 
correlated (Pearson’s r = .33, p < .001). Full results are available upon request. In 
sum, the overall positive effects of peaceful action efficacy suggest that when 
peaceful action has high efficacy, it can be appealing even if aggressive action is also 
efficacious, in line with the gun and the olive branch hypothesis. Furthermore, when 
aggression has low efficacy, the less efficacious peaceful action is, the lower its 
appeal is, but the greater the appeal of aggressive action (nothing to lose hypothesis).  
4 There were various items relating to the efficacy of mass nonviolence (e.g. effect of using 
nonviolence on international support), but we picked the item with the greatest face validity 
in relation to our construct of interest.  
5 We conducted further analyses on a measure of nonviolence support using the 
following item: “If there was a large-scale Palestinian movement committed to 
nonviolent action against Israeli occupation using such methods as demonstrations, 
boycotts, and civil disobedience, would you approve or disapprove of such a 
movement?”, on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disapprove to strongly 
approve, which we reverse coded (see footnote 6). 
6
 For exploratory purposes, we conducted analyses on support for peaceful collective 
action and regressed it on the same predictors (see footnote 3). As expected, peaceful 
action efficacy emerged as a significant positive predictor, over and above the effect 
of aggressive action efficacy. As for aggressive action efficacy, it had no effect. Note 
that aggressive and peaceful action support did not correlate (Pearson’s r = -.03). Full 
results are available upon request. In sum, the overall positive effect of peaceful 
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action efficacy suggests that when peaceful action has high efficacy, it can be 
appealing even if aggressive action is also efficacious, in line with the gun and the 
olive branch hypothesis (see footnote 3). Furthermore, when aggression has low 
efficacy, the less efficacious peaceful action is, the lower its appeal is, but the greater 
the appeal of aggressive action (nothing to lose hypothesis).  
7 See footnotes 3 and 6. 
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Table 1 
Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 1, N = 243) 
 Scale M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Efficacy of Peaceful Action 0 to 9 5.26 2.11 - .31*** .22*** .20*** 
2. Efficacy of Aggressive Action 0 to 9 3.67 2.80  - .83*** .73*** 
3. Support for Aggression -5 to 5 -.1.00 3.18   - .76*** 
4. Aggressive Action Tendencies 0 to 9 2.69 2.88    - 
** p < .01; *** p < .001  
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Table 2 
Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 2, N = 533) 
 Scale M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Efficacy of Peaceful Action 1 to 4 2.17 1.03 - -.00 -.13** .33*** -.19*** 
2. Efficacy of Aggressive Action 1 to 4 2.81 1.00  - .27*** -.05 .18*** 
3. Desire for Vengeance 1 to 4 3.46 .80   - -.17** .31*** 
4. Perceived Counter-productivity of 
Aggression 
1 to 4 2.20 1.00    - -.30*** 
5. Support for Aggression 0 to 10 7.70 3.15     - 
* p < .05; ** p < .001 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Illustration of three alternative hypotheses on how the link between the perceived 
efficacy of peaceful collective action and aggressive collective action could vary as a function 
of the perceived efficacy of aggressive action. 
 
Figure 2. Simple slopes of support for aggressive collective action regressed on the perceived 
efficacy of peaceful collective action at mean, low and high levels of the perceived efficacy of 
aggressive collective action (one standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively) 
(Study 1). The interaction is plotted using unstandardized coefficients. 
 
Figure 3. Simple slopes of support for aggressive collective action regressed on the perceived 
efficacy of peaceful collective action at mean, low and high levels of the perceived efficacy of 
aggressive collective action (one standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively) 
(Study 2). The interaction is plotted using unstandardized coefficients. 
 
Figure 4. Simple slopes of support for aggressive collective action regressed on the perceived 
efficacy of peaceful collective action at low, mean and high levels of the perceived efficacy of 
aggressive collective action (one standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively) 
(Study 2). The interaction is plotted using unstandardized coefficients, controlling for desire 
for vengeance and the perceived counter-productivity of aggression. 
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Figure 1 
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